Concordia Theological Monthly
Volume 14

Article 2

1-1-1943

Toward a Lutheran Philosophy of Education
Paul Bretscher
Concordia Seminary, St. Louis

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.csl.edu/ctm
Part of the Religious Thought, Theology and Philosophy of Religion Commons

Recommended Citation
Bretscher, Paul (1943) "Toward a Lutheran Philosophy of Education," Concordia Theological Monthly: Vol.
14 , Article 2.
Available at: https://scholar.csl.edu/ctm/vol14/iss1/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Print Publications at Scholarly Resources from
Concordia Seminary. It has been accepted for inclusion in Concordia Theological Monthly by an authorized editor
of Scholarly Resources from Concordia Seminary. For more information, please contact seitzw@csl.edu.

Bretscher: Toward a Lutheran Philosophy of Education
8

Toward • Lutheran Pbllmophy of Education

Toward a Lutheran Philosophy of Education
(Thia la a revlaed and extended venlon of an eaay read In one of
the plenary meet.lnp of the Board for Hlaher F.ducatlon, which convened
in Milwaukee July 28---a. It la herewith submitted by request.
I am deeply grateful to Prof. Nelson B. Henry of the University of
Chicago, secrc~-trensurer of The National Society for the Study of
Education, for having granted me written permlalon to quote pertinent
paaages from the Y earboo1c.-P. B.)
This is not the first attempt in our circles to approach the

subject of "a Lutheran philosophy of education." Every committee
of Synod which was charged with the task to examine ond, by
helpful suggestions, to improve our progrom of higher education
has, with varying degrees of comprehensiveness, articulotcd our
philosophy of education. Especially is this true of the work done
by Synod's recent "Curriculum Committees," which laid down
guiding objectives of education in their reports on our junior
colleges, theological seminaries, and teachers colleges, and called
attention to the peculiar place of our system of higher education
in the American scene. On the elementary level, materials published by the Board of Christian Education have also defined our
posltlon in education and laid down alma and objectives. I should
call special attention to the Curriculuma published by our men in
the teaching profession, in which objectives and activities ore
thoroughly presented. Other materials published here and there
in our circles have also dealt with some phase or other of the vast
subject of a Lutheran philosophy of education. Of special significance I regard the essay which your secretary, President 0. P.
Kretzmann, read before this body a year and a half ago (meeting
of Jan. 17-19, 1940) and titled "A Lutheran Philosophy of Education." In this excellent paper, Dr. Kretzmann analyzed briefly
the principles underlying Protestant or secular, totalitarian, Roman
Catholic, and Lutheran education, and appended a number of
algnificant conclusions for consideration by this group. There
appeared also a little more than a year ago in the Journal of
Theolom, of the American Luthen1n Confe-rence a notable nrticle
on the Lutheran philosophy of education by Prof. W. P. Hieronymus
under the caption "A Philosophy of Christian Education in the
Lutheran Church."
Nevertheless it does not seem out of place to present another
paper on the subject, the immediate occasion being the appearance
several months ago (February) of the Fortv-FiTst YecirbooJc of the
Nciticmal Societv for the Stwiv of Education, Part I of which presents five current philosophies of education. Though some of
these philosophies take into account chiefly the elementary level
of American education, the basic metaphysical assumptions of
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all of them have a direct bearing on higher levela of education
as well. The historical overview was contributed by Prof. E. R
Reisner of Columbia and the critical and comparative analysis by
Prof. John S. Brubacher of Yale. The titles and authors of the
five philosophies represented in the YeaT"book are:
1. Philosoph11 of Education fT"om the Ezperimentalist Outlook,
by Willlam H. Kilpatrick (PJ"Of. emff., Columbia).
2. Edumtion and the Realistic Outlook, by Frederick S. Breed
(University of Chicago).
3. An Idealistic Philosop1111 of Edumtion, by Herman H. Horne
(New York University).
4. In Defense of the Philosoph11 of Edumtion, by Mortimer J.
Adler (University of Chicago).
5. The Philosop1111 of Catholic Edumtion, by William McGucken,
• S. J. (St. Louis University).
By way of general comments on the Y eClT"book I should like
to say:
1. A year and a half ago Prof. L. Bickel of Seward called
attention to the fact that the N. S.S. E. was planning this YeaT"book.
Professor Bickel, Prof. F. E. Mayer, myself, and others considered
what might be done to have our views on education represented in
this YeaT"book. We had Prof. A. Haentzschel from Valparaiso University draw up a brief statement. This was sent to Prof. J. S.
Brubacher, chairman of the Society's Committee on Philosophies
of Education. After some days we received from Professor Brubacher a reply to the effect that our views represented a denominational approach and that if the Committee were to incorporate
them in the Y eaT"book, "other Protestant sects would have to be
taken in," obviously, as Professor Haentzscbel later remarked,
"a poor argument since no other Protestant body does any parocblal
school work worth mentioning." In short, inclusion of a Lutheran
philosophy of education in the YeaT"book was not granted by Professor Brubacher. This body might give some thought to this
situation and its implications.
2. The Ye11T"bo0Jc failed to take note of other folks. It does
not contain a philosophy of vocational training. The fact is that
in 1938 an annual enrollment of 2,000,000 pupils in vocational
classes out of a total of 6,000,000 in all types of classes in the public
high schools was officially reported. Without a doubt the expanding system of vocational training ls definitely encouraging
a dual system of schools and a separation of the vocational from
the cultural schools. Neither ls the Worker's :Education Movement, which is sponsored by American Labor groups and which
educates tens of thousands of Americans, represented in the
YeaT"book.
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3. We regret, finalbr, that the Yec&T"booJc, though It touches on
the problem of higher education analyzed by President Robert
Hutchins in his The Higher Lee&ning in America does not anywhere subject this problem and the solution suggested by President
Hutchins to a critical analysis.
But In spite of these omlsslons, Pein l of the FoT"ty-FiT"st
Yee&T"booJc offers a mine of Information on current pbllosophical
thought in education. Unquestionably this Yee&T"booJc will receive
considerable attention and be regarded a valuable depository of
philosophical views on education distinctive of our day and age.
ID my paper I shall attempt to do the following:
I. Present a resume of the philosophies of education published
in the Y eaT"booJc.
II. Present briefty the historical and educational background
which the philosophies of education presented in the Yee&T"booJc
body forth.
m. Present a theory of a Lutheran philosophy of education.
L B&um6 of the Philosophies of Education Published in the Yearbook
A. Philosophy of Educ:cition from the Ezperimente&list OutlooJc,

by Willlam H. Kilpatrick
Professor Kilpatrick needs no introduction. "Aside from
overthrowing the orthodoxies of theology and mathematics, Profeaor Kilpatrick has challenged most educational theory on
pragmatic premises•••. He is author, Joint author, and editor
of some of the most provocative books in American education."
(John T. Wahlquist, The Philo1oph11 of Ameriee&n Educcition. New
York, 1942, p. 387.)
Professor Kilpatrlck's contribution to the YeiirbooJc represents
the pragmatic point of view in education. It is obviously impossible
in this brief essay to present a detailed account of his views.
We must confine ourselves to essentials. After defining the scope
and purpose of the philosophy of education as well as the meaning
of education, Professor Kilpatrick discusses the world of experience. He believes that there is such a thing as knowledge as
opposed to opinlon. This knowledge is achieved and grows purely
out of experience, that is, out of the continuous interaction between
the 0!1PUJlsm and the environment, or the person and the situation.
Mankind has over a period of many years accumulated a vast store
of knowledge. But only In comparatively recent times (th~
Greeks made the start, the scientists of the Renaissance continued
where the Greeks left off) dld man come to view all knowledge
critically. Thus there has come into existence experimental
science. The findings of experimental science are, however, never
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final and absolute, but are always open to revlalon. The method
of experimental aclence, so Profeaor Kilpatrick further bellevea,
should be applied to all forms of human education, not only to
tangible data of observation. Th1a experimental method Is the
pragmatic method. It rests on three conceptions:
1. Ideas mean only their consequences In experience;
2. Experience is essentially social In origin and predominantly
social In purpose;
3. We find out what to expect In life by studying experimentally
the uniformities within experience.
This method the educator should apply also to morals. There
are implicit, so Professor Kilpatrick believes, in children the
beginnings of a goodly number of ethical conceptions, such as
regard for others, fair play, etc. Thougli he admits that human
nature provides a certain initial endowment of intelligence and
susceptibility to action, he does not seem to be clear regarding
the source of the child's moral conceptions. We therefore ask:
Are these conceptions purely the result of interaction between the
child and environment, or are they, at least basically, innate?
And if innate, are they survivals of an evolutionary process in
which man in course of time developed higher and higher standards
of moral living, or are they i02'ate In the sense that they are
reflections of the Moral Law which God at creation wrote into
man's heart? By means of the pragmatic method, so Professor
Kilpatrick continues, the educator trains children to regard others,
to develop an attitude of responsibility, and to assume obligations.
But how will the child decide which of two or more possible
actions in a given moral situation is of greater moral worth? Here
Professor Kilpatrick falls back on Dewey's five steps of experimental thinking (see John Dewey, Ho1D We Thinlc, first chapters).
Professor Kilpatrick's principles of ethics are, the following (note
that they are largely Kantian both In form and content. One Is
led to exclaim: Kant and Kilpatrick, what a combination!): •
1. Each person is to be treated always as end and never
merely as means. In this ethical respect all men are to stand equal.
2. Conversely, each person is under moral obligation so to act
as, negatively, not to hurt the good life of others and, positively,
to foster the good life of all
3. The more honestly and carefully study Is carried on by
different individuals and groups, the more likely will they reach
like results.
4. Th~ free play of Intelligence stands as our final resource to
tell us what to do - intelligence playing freely upon experience in
any and all of its content, including the use of intelligence itself.
(Note: Professor Kilpatrick acknowledges no· higher authority
than reason to tell man what to do in a given moral situation.)

https://scholar.csl.edu/ctm/vol14/iss1/2

4

Bretscher: Toward a Lutheran Philosophy of Education

12

Toward a Lutheran Phlloaophy of Education

5. We know no absolute principles; that is, none which now
stand properly above criticism or which may not conceivably be
modified, perhaps in intent, perha_ps _in application, as new conditions arise. (Note: Moral standards are relative and have no
fixed stars!)
6. From all the foregoing, democracy follows as the effort to
run society on the combined basis of the good life and ethics, as
these are numaged co-ope1·atively by the members themselves.
Professor Kilpatrick next enlarges on the concept "group
culture." There is such a thing as group culture, a social heritage.
The child becomes acquainted with this culture at a very enrly
age through experience. But because present society is dynamic
and no longer static as it was, so Professor Kilpatrick argues, only
a few decades ago, schools have a much greater task and duty
to perform in the way of having the child experience this culture
than they did years ago. Schools must especially build social
intelligence. "We have in the past century or two built and sp1·ead
scientific intelligence. We must next build social intelligence and
spread it effectively among our people" (p. 66) .
The discussion of group culture is followed by an analysis of
.the learning process and the work of the school. Professor Kilpatrick, who bas consistently in his educational career emphasized
the importance of activity in the learning process (he is the
strongest enthusiast of the project method), also in this al'ticle
stresses learning by doing. He analyzes the lenming process as
follows: Each child learns what he lives; he lea1'fls it as he
accepts it in his own heart to act on; he learns it in the degree
that it is important to him and in the degree that it has menningful
connections with what he already knows; what he learns he builds
at once into character (p. 69). Professor Kilpatrick advocates
a type of school where "living goes on, the best and finest type
of living we can help our young people to create" (p. 74). ''The
activity schools show as good subject-matter knowledge and skills
as do the old. For my own part, I think the new type school
should do better at the defensible old line skills" (p. 76).
What about the curriculum? Professor Kilpatrick defmes
the curriculum as ''the whole living of the pupils or students so
far as the school accepts responsibility for its quality" (p. 76).
He believes in an emerging curriculum. "In the sense formerly
understood by subject-matter requirements there is not much
that I should care to name in advance that must in the end be
learned, and still less should I wish to state when it will be learned.
I know that there is a considerable body of common knowledge
and common skills that any decently educated group will show;
but I don't believe that naming this body in advance is the helpful
way to begin" (p. 77). "I would use no textbooks as such, but
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instead all sorts of reference books. Many of these would need to
be prepared for varying age levels. I would give no marks in
either elementary or secondary school, and send no regular report
cards, especially of a kind intended to compare one pupil with
another. I think all such seriously hinder the kind of living the
schools exist to foster'' (p. 78).
Professor Kilpatrick concludes his philosophy of education
with a chapter titled "Education and the Improving of Life in
Society." He discusses the relation of the individual to society,
the nature of the economic problem ("a system that can produce
more than it can dispose of, and yet leaves millions strandedsuch a system cannot be defended," p. 82), common dependence,
common responsibility, and the obligations which rest on education
for improving the life of society. His optimistic outlook leads him
to say, "If the schools will do their part, we can hope for a great
increase in social intelligence among our people. Already it seems
true that a larger proportion of our people are studying and
thinking than ever before" (p. 84).
We are concluding our brief analysis of Professor Kilpatrick's
philosophy of education with the following summary:
1. Education being due to the interaction of the organism
with the environment must promote such interaction.
2. The method to be employed by educational philosophy
should be that of science.
3. There is knowledge (as opposed to opinion) of some sort,
but this knowledge is of a p1·ecarious character, due to the novelly
emerging universe. There are no absolute principles, no fixed stars.
"In a futu1·e that is mo1·e or less uncertain, Professor Kilpatrick
finds whatever stability the1·e is in his experimental method and
i.n whatever store of already tested experience it has been able
to accumulate" (criticism by Professor Brubacher, pp. 299, 300).
4. P1·ofessor Kilpatl'ick's principles on morals are largely
Kantian both in form and content.
5. Moral education is the product of social experience.
6. The self is a social product; nature provides, however, a
certain native endowment of intelligence and susceptibility to
action.
7. Good is what satisfies the organism's cravings; therefore
the good is a subjective and relative thing. Intelligence must
decide which of two or more goods one should prefer and strive
to achieve.
8. The aim of education should be: The child should learn
to live the' life of the group and accept appropriate responsibilities
therewith. Here Professor Kilpatrick's analysis of human behavior,
which in many respects is penetrating indeed, breaks down woefully because he optimistically assumes that, as a result of moral
education, the naturally self-centered individual will in a given
conflict between self and group deny his ego and submerge it in
the interest of the group. It is the same tragic mistake which
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, ls always made by natural man who does not know that the power
of the Gospel, and the power of the Gospel alone, la able to move
a hardhearted self-centered sinner to deny himself ln the Interest
of the group. The writer of the following quotation, for Instance,
baa no solution for the problem which he so clearly defines:
"Our problem ls today what lt was of old: the art of combining independence and co-operation. Without independence,

man mlasea hla highest political development, his dlgnity as man,
his creative power; without co-operation, his lndepencfence becomes
selfish, his creativeness sterile, his sentiment a source of strife
and misunderstanding. It ls in the harmonization of these two
principles that true freedom rests." (The Contempon1rv Reuif!1D,
July, 1942, p. 48.)
9. Schools should be activity schools.
10. Schools must play their part ln the Improvement of society.
11. The child ls superior to the State (opposed to the Aristotelian and the totalitarian point of view).
B. Education and the Realistic Outlook, by Frederick S. Breed
Professor Breed represents the neorealistic approach to education. Neorealism ls sponsored by such philosophers as Ralph
Barton Perry and Bertrand Russell. It has much ln common with
modern critical realism, though it differs from lt ln Its interpretation
of a significant factor ln the theory of knowledge.
Professor Breed joined the faculty of the University of Chicago
ln 1917. His earlier contributions were ln the fields of psychology,
educational measurements, classroom management, spelling, and
arithmetic. In 1939 he published Education and the New Realiam.
Neorealism ls not a systematic type of philosophy. It does not,
like Idealism or even pragmatism, attempt to deal ambitiously
with all problems confronting the twentieth century man. It has
not as yet built up philosophic systems, like those of Kant, Hegel,
or Dewey. It ls rather a critical, reactionary mood. It began by
criticizing idealism and later pragmatism. Its history goes back to
the Scotch common-sense school (represented by leading English
thinkers at the end of the eighteenth century and quite popular in
our country at that time), and was opposed' to the higher speculations of rationalism and empiricism. But though neorealism is
largely a revival of the common-sense tradition, some of its leading
ideas spring from modern sources.
The doctrines of neorealism are briefly these:
1. There ls ln the process of knowing some external reality
which is independent of the knower and different from the knower.
It ls not dependent for existence on a knowing factor, u sensation.
Objects may move about ln the knowing BUbject without becoming
changed. Objects Include also concepts. Also these are independent. They exist even when the knower does not think of
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them (note the dilference between th1a view and Kant's projec:tlon
of categories).
2. This knowing relation la a unique relation. It dilfers from
pragmatism, which defines knowing In terms of activity and adjustment. It dilfers also from idealism, which defines knowing
as involving also willing and feeling and which joins logic
and ethics.
It ls this approach to the theory of knowledge which Professor
Breed presents at length in his Education and the New Reczlum
(Macmillan, 1939) and which is the basis of his philosophy of
education published. in the YeczTboolc.
To discuss the details of Professor Breed's point of view would
mean going far beyond the scope of this essay. We can do no
more than present the heart of his philosophy and its chief
implications.
In an introductory chapter Professor Breed stresses the need
of educational preparedness and of interest in fundamentals.
He hurls this accusation at the educational world:
We have been challenged and have been found wanting. We
have been found wanting not ony in material defense; we have
been found wanting in mental defense as well As a people we
have had neither the arguments nor the armaments to repel
totalitarian attack (p. 88).
In the first major part of his essay he discusses the temper
of the realistic mind under the heads: definition of philosophy,
impressive revival of realism, basic principle of realism. He regards
"philosophy as continuous with science, not separate therefrom.
A.-; here defined, the subject has neither materials nor methods
peculiar to itself, but employs the materials and the methods of
science. It differs from science • . . in the degree of generality
of its problems" (p. 91). In passing, it should be said that the
ncorealist's and the experimentalist's interpretation of the relation
of philosophy to science constitutes a crucial point of difference
between both philosophies.
The basic principle of neorealism is, according to Professor
Breed, the principle of independence. "A realist does not believe
that the process of knowledge is constitutive of its objects. Whereas
instrumentalism ("instrumentalism" is Dewey's version of pragmatism) believes that objects are CTeczted by acts of cognition, the
realist believes that they are discloaed by such acts" (p. 93). One
finds it difticult at first to appreciate of what immediate significance
the principle of independence ls for the educative process. Even
Professor Breed admits, "Since no one has as yet worked out
the educational implications of modern realism In any fullness,
much will remain to be done after the present chapter la com-
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pleted" (p. 94). But u one reads on - the presentation is very
critical and controverslal- one begins to realize that Professor
Breed la subtly attac:klng experimentalism at Its roots. Neoreallsm
posits the independent reality of a thing. Thia means when applied
to the educative process that a thing has meaning not only when
the experimentalist creates it by means of the Interaction of the
organlam with the environment, but that lt la meaningful per ae,
being both pre-existent and post-existent. There la, therefore,
the poaslblllty at least that truth exists. There mny be such
a thing as a reasonably stable curriculum even though the experimentalist, who la possessed by the idea of the "novelly emerging," may deny lt. And thus one pins the impression that ultimately Professor Breed la holding out for subject matter, truth,
and authority, even though he clings to the methods and the
establlahed data of scientific experimentation.
In support of this Interpretation of Professor Breed's philosophy
of education - lf we are wrong, we trust readers will correct us we are adducing a number of ldgnlficant statements which occur
in the remaining chapters of h1a essay. These chapters are titled:
"Knowledge and the Educative Process"; "Realism veraua Instrumentallam"; "In Defense of Realism"; "The Notion of Truth";
"The Bipolar Theory of Education"; "Foundation of Educational
Measurement"; and, "The School and the Social Order." Referring
to the ''progressives," Professor Breed writes:
They become so absorbed in the process ( viz., the process
rather than the product of the knowledge quest) that in unrestrained and irresponsible moments some of them pooh-pooh
the truths of subjects as of small consequence in a program of
instruction (p. 95).
In a paragraph In which he posits the question "What value
in conservatism?" he replies:
To the writer there is no progress without conservatism. . . .
Conservatism .•. means a healthy respect for the human values
realized to date. It maintains that these values represent our
moat precious social Inheritance. . . . The conservative believes
that educational prosperity ls like business prosperity; it demands
attention to profits as well as to processes of production (pp. 96, 97).
In h1a chapter on "Realism veraua Instrumentaliam," he takes
the instrumentalists to task as follows:
Instrumentalism ls aolipslstlc In character, suffering from the
rigors of a radical and parsimonious methodology, ft.outing the
Intuitions of common sense regarding the existence of an external
world, and attributing creative power to the Intelligence of man
to supply data of knowledge that an amputated cosmos can no
longer supply (p. 101).
This philosophy (instrumentallsm) ls to Inspire its devotees
with quixotic schemes of educational, political, and economic

I
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refonn. The world that man has made, he can quite easily unmake,
they tend to believe, as lf man were the measure of all things. • . •
The more radical exponents of this philosophy • . . have been
accountable for most of the romantic adventures in "creative
education," they have been responsible for encouraging the heresy
that truth is a fetish of conservatives designed to keep a longsuffering world in its accustomed groove, they have been responsible
for shaking the confidence of teachers and pupils in the fundamentals of the democratic way of life, and for holding up the
Russian model as a pattern for a more beautiful society (p. 101).
Professor Breed holds to the p1-agmatic method, but with important reservations. He writes:
The realist is generally regarded as a somewhat more conservative individual (In comparison with the instrumentalist) and
probably is. He is somewhat more conservative because he has
more respect than the instrumentalist for the truths of science. • • .
To him an idea or a plan of action achieves the stamp of truth •••
by conformity with something external to itself and not of its
own creation. . . . The laws of the physical world thus become
more than mere assel'tions regarding the qualities and interrelations
of thought c1·eations. They are statements, including mathematical
formulas, reflecting the nature and interrelations of independent
existents - a vast concourse of entities with which our personal
entities must live and about which they must know if they would
live effectively (p. 101).
In his chapter - the most significant in the essay - titled
"In Defense of Realism," Professor Breed says:
Realism in its totality is an hypothesis. So is instrumentalism.
The realist is a fellow close to common sense and to the common
man in his attitude toward knowledge (p. 105).
In the same chapter he quotes approvingly of R. B. Perry's
castigation of Dewey's emphasis on activity, to wit:
For Dewey, activity is an ineffable ultimate assumed as the
mysterious source from which all objects and ideas somehow
blossom forth (p. 106).
Professor Breed continues:
The realist, in the presence of a problem, is just as much
interested as the instrumentalist in the question, "What in the
name of Heaven shall I do?" but he is also tremendously interested
in the question, ''What in the name of Heaven is that?" His
interest in the second question, true, is often, though not always,
subsidiary to his interest in the first. The instrumentalist seldom
stresses the query "What is that?" as the central theme of inquiry,
alte r the manne1· of William James, for he believes "that" which
problematically confronts him is not yet what comes to be known.
His language is reminiscent of Gel'trude Stein and the cult of
the unintelligible, for he seems to say: If anything is anything, it is
something that it is not yet (p. 107).
For Professor Breed, knowledge has at least relative stability.
He writes:
2
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Most instrumentalists are irked by a man like President
Hutchins, who stresses the relatively permanent elements of experience and the importance of acquiring knowledge of such
elements. The Newtonian law of gravitation remained unmodified
for two centuries, and even after Einstein attached an amendment, the old law remains valid for all general purposes (p. 108).
As to the place of subject matter in the curriculum, Professor
Breed says:
The traditional subject curriculum is overgrown with moss,
but subject matter, the fundamental truth that has accrued from
the historic stream of human experience, remains among the
transcendent aims of education, to be achieved indirectly, yes, and
directly as well, but in any case to be achieved (p. 122).
Perhaps the most devastating criticism of Dewey's doctrine
of relativity that ever came to our attention we found in Professor
Breed's caustic remark:
The menace of authoritarianism does not inhere in a progressive but always tentative systematization of knowledge, any
more than it inheres in the apparent changelessness of Dewey's
philosophy of change, or the relativity of all doctrines but his
doctrine of relativity, or the persistence without shadow of turning
c;f his radical-empirical principle, or the perdurability of his operational criterion of truth. If these are not dogmas, one gets no hint
of it from his undeviating adherence to them for over a generation (p. 123).
In summarizlng Professor Breed's outlook, we would say:
1. Neorealism inclines to a conservative point of view, though
it has its source and basis in the methods and findings of scientific inquiry,
2. It argues with conservatism for the application in education
to the diacouffll of pre-existent facts as against the CTeatiuity concept of the instrumentalists.
3. It objects to an overemphasis on activity and method at the
expense of subject matter and content.
4. It is materialistic, inasmuch as it believes that the psychical
and the physical belong to the same continuum.
5. It stresses direct, not only indirect interest.
6. It believes that the educator must strive to build up in
th~ child a balance between freedom and authority, but does
not show how this can be done.
7. It believes with Aristotle that human nature is the same
essentially for all men, and that individual differences are accidental and should not be overstressed.
8. It holds that the child is superior to the State (opposed to
the doctrine of Aristotle and the totalitarian powers).
C. An Idecdiatic Philoaoph11 of Education, by Herman H. Horne
Professor Home is professor of history of education and history
of philosophy at New York University. He is regarded a Christian idealist. "In his philosophy God is the prime center of
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reference, Jesus Christ ls the symbol of the kind of life a ploua man
may strive after and the assurance of God's benevolent attltude
toward man" (Norman Woelfel, Moldffa of the American Mmd,
p. 51). He has written such books as Je111.U1, Ou" Standanl (1918);·
Modem PT"Oblema cu Jeaua Sa.,a Them (1918); Jenu,-the Mcutn
TeczcheT" (1920); Jeaua cu a. PhiloaopheT" (1927). According to
Wahlquist (op. cit., p. 386), Professor Home ls known best ln educational circles for his exposition and ldeallstlc commentary on
Dewey's DemoCT"czcy cznd EduccztiO'R, known as The DemoCT"CZtic
Philoaophy of Education (1932).
Except for his strong religious Interest and for the inclusion
ln his philosophy of much that modern science of education has
to offer, Professor Home represents perhaps the most forceful
present-day leader of the type of idealism which, under the leadership of Hegel, began its triumphant march some hundred years
ago and which even the powerful assaults of naturallstlc science
on all forms of idealism have not been able to check. The reason
is that idealism, or at least types of it, ls so firmly rooted in human
experience that though crushed to the ground, it always rises
again. As Professor Wahlquist (op. cit., p. 46) puts lt:
Historically, idealism is the oldest of the three viewpoints
(idealism, realism, and pragmatism}. Traditionally, it ls the
strongest; most of us were born and reared under its influence.
The state, the church, and the family are highly idealistic. Try
as we will to escape, most of us remain idealists all of our lives.
Even the most cold-blooded scientist and the most hard-headed
pragmatist have moments when they walk by faith ln a system not
established ln scientific laboratories or completely verified by
human experience.
Professor Home's essay consists of two parts. In part one
he enlarges on Idealism as a philosophy of education. "Ideallsm,"
as defined by Professor Home, "is the conclusion that the universe
is an expression of intelligence and will, that the enduring substance of the world is of the nature of mind, that the material
is explained by the mental" (p. 139).
Professor Home develops this definition at some length and
submits ten reasons for accepting idealism. Though much of this
material seems quite irrelevant to his philosophy of education,
it does suggest the underpinning of his educational views.
In the second part of his essay Professor Home discusses the
learner and his learning; the curriculum; methods of teaching;
school and society; and objectives of living and learning. In his
account of "the learner," Professor Home believes that the teacher
should recognize the pnsonality of the pupll and cultivate that
personality. He argues that from the naturalistic viewpoint ''the
pupil is not only a grouping of atoms, but his reactions to the
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actions of hla environment are mechanical. He la really a machlne"
(p. 152) ; from the reallstlc point of view "the pupil la just a nervous
system In a physical body responding selectively to the stimuli
of his environment" (p. 152); from the pragmatic point of view
the pupil la an "orpnlsm endowed with the capacity for an undetermined and original response to a specific situation" (p. 153).
"Pragmatism," so Professor Home tells us, "has the advantage over
naturalism and reallam of recognizing the unpredictable factors In
the behavior of the pupil, which makes of him nn individual who
counts for something'' (p. 153). But idealism has a higher appreciation of the pupil. Pupils are not machines, they are not a series
of mechanical reactions to selected stimuli, nnd they Q1'e not mere
lndlvlduals (even lower animals and Inanimate objects possess
lndlvlduallty), but pupils are "peT1ona, with the capacity to formulate, feel, and follow ideals of conduct" (p. 153). Because the
pupil ls a person, he can be taught, cultivated, and be trained lo
follow the path that leads to perfection even though he may not
reach the final goal
"The curriculum," so Professor Home believes, ''has strategic
import" (p. 150). "It sho1,1ld undertake lo give a rounded view of
man in his world, a taste for the best things In life, and the ability
to take one's own practical part In the world" {p. 160). It should
be "ideal-centered," rather than "child-centered" or "soelelycentered" (versus "progressivism" and experimentalism). The
curriculum must include, In keeping with the nature of man as
a being who thinks, feels, and wills, the sciences (physics, chemistry,
biology, geography, mathematics, astronomy, psychology, and
sociology); it must include also the fine arts (drawing, painting,
sculpture, architecture, the various forms of poetic and prose
literature, and the rhythmic temporal art of music); and it must
include the practical arts (e.g.: agriculture, the industrial arts,
the political arts, such as the making of war and the concluding
of peace treaties).
Professor Horne presents a good overview of methods. But
he concludes: "We overdo methodology. Adapt yourself to the
situation, use well the method you adopt, get your subject liked, get
yourself liked. It la not enough to know method. We must
know our pupils and our subjects, and we must be likable people"
{p.172).
• As to objectives of education, Professor Home inclines to
those advocated by the :Eclucatlonal Policies Commission, to wit:
self-realization, human relationships, economic efficiency, and civic
responsiblllty. But he adds: ''There la no objection to this statement if we include enough under 'self-realization,' especially health,
art, science, philosophy, and religion" (p.191). Of Interest, though
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of doubtful value because of its obvious over-slmpllficatlcms, ls
Professor Home's comparison of naturalism, pragmatism, and
idealism by means of symbols intended to express fundamental
aspects of these philosophies of education. We regret that he
did not include neorealism:
Natundiam.
P-ragmatiam.
Idealism
naturo-centric
anthropo-centrlc
theo-centrlc
body
mind
soul
senses
creativity and growth
spirituality
the actual
the practical
the Ideal
might
using intelligence
using right
survival
acting socially
making sacrifices
organism
individuality
personality
We briefly summarize Professor Home's views:
1. Idealism is traditional in its outlook.
2. It recognizes absolute principles though it holds that only
the mind can discover them.
3. It believes in a moral world order which sees to it that
everyone receives his reward in time or in eternity.
4. It believes that true reality is mind, ideas, purposes, personality. It rejects all forms of materialism which reduce ideas
and purposes to some fo1-m of physical existence.
5. It holds that schools should aid in improving society.
G. It believes with experimentalism and realism that the child
is superior to the State.
D. In D efense of the Pllilosopl&y of Education, by Mortimer J. Adler
Prof. Mortimer J. Adle1· is associate professor of the philosophy
of law at the University of Chicago. Among his chief publications
arc: Crime, Law and Social Science (1932); The Natu-re of
T-raditional P-roof (1933); What Man Has Made of Man (1937);
St. Thomas and the Gentiles (1938); P-roblems fo-r Thomists (1940).
He has also contributed notable articles to various periodicals.
Some of them appeared in P-roceedings of the AmC!rican Catholic
Philosophy Association.
Professor Adle1· is frequently referred to as an Aristotelian.
One reason ls that he shares with Aristotle some of the Stagyrite's
basic assumptions. Another reason is that his style is strikingly
r eminiscent of Aristotle's manner of presentation. He occasionally
employs the technique of syllogistic reasoning, which the reader
unschooled in deductive logic finds difficult to follow. Professor
Adler believes with Aristotle that it is possible to build up a system
of first principles, a system of metaphysics, to which every rational
ci·eature must subscribe. But Professor Adler also shows affinities
with scholastic thought, though Professor McGucken, S. J., is led
to say of him and President Hutchins:
With the metaphysical principles of which President Hutchins
speaks -which Professor Adler has clearly enunciated- the
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Catholic will readily concur. Ills only di8iculty ls that they do
not go far eJ?-Ough (p. 258).
In order to appreciate the full Implications of Professor Adler'•
essay In the Yeci,-booJc, one does well to consider Professor Adler's
views of philosophy, theology, and aclence, which he eloquently
expressed at the Confe,-,mce of Science, Philoaoph11 cind Religion
in New York City In September, 1940, and which I take the
privilege to submit:
With respect to philosophy, Professor Adler claims, "the following propositions must be affirmed. He who denies any one
of them denies philosophy":
1. Philosophy ls public knowledge, not private opinion, in
the same sense that ac:ience ls knowledge, not opinion.
2. Philosophical knowledge answers questions which science
cannot answer, now or ever, because its method ls not adapted
to answering such questions.
3. Because their methods are thus distinct, each being adapted
to a different object or inquiry, philosophical and scientific knowledge are logically independent of one another, which means that
the truth and falslty of philosophical principles or conclusions
do not depend upon the changing content of scientific knowledge.
4. Philosophy ls superior to science, both theoretically and
practically; theoretically, because it ls knowledge of the being
of things, whereas science studies only their phenomenal manifestations; practically, because philosophy establishes moral conclusions, whereas scientific knowledge yields only technological
applications; this last point means that science can give us only
a control over operable me~.l_ but it cannot make a single judgment about good and bad, rignt and wrong, in terms of the ends
of human life.
5. There can be no conflict between scientific and philosophic
truths, although philosophers may correct the errors of scientists
who try to answer questions beyond their professional competence1
just as ac:ientlsts can correct the errors of philosophers guilty ot
a similar transgression.
6. There are no systems of philosophy, each of which may be
considered true in its own way by criteria of internal consistency,
each diJferlng from the others, as so many systems of geometry,
in terms of different origins in diverse, but equally arbitrary,
postulates or definitions.
7. The first principles of all philosophical knowledge are
metaphysical, and metaphysics is valid knowledge of both sensible
and supra-sensible being.
8. Metaphysics is able to demonstrate the existence of suprasensible being, for it can demonstrate the existence of God by
appealing to the evidence of the senses and the principles of reason.
and without any reliance upon articles of religious faith.
With respect to religion_ theology, and faith, Professor Adler
laid down the following theses:
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1. Religion involves knowledge of God and of man's destiny,
knowledge which ls not naturally acquired in the sense in which
both science and philosophy are natural knowledge.
2. Religious faith, on which sacred theology rests, ls itself
a supernatural act of the human intellect and ls thus a Divine gift.
3. Because God is its cause, faith ls more certain than
knowledge resulting from the purely natural action of the human
faculties.
4. What is known by faith about God's nature and man's
destiny is knowledge which exceeds the power of the human
intellect to attain without God's revelation of Himself and His
providence.
5. Sacred theology is independent of philosophy, in that its
p1·inciples are truths of reason, but this does not mean that
theology can be speculatively developed without reason serving
faith.
6. There can be no conflict between philosophical and theological truths, although theologians may correct the errors of
philosophers who try to answer questions beyond the competence
of natural reason, just as philosophers can correct the errors of
theologians who violate the autonomy of reason.
7. Sacred theology is superior to philosophy both theoretically
and prnctically; theoretically, because it is more perfect knowledge
of God and His creatures; practically, because moral philosophy
is insufficient to direct man to God as his last end.
8. Just as there are no systems of philosophy, but only
philosophical knowledge less or more adequately possessed by
different men, so there is only one true religion, less or more
adequately embodied in the existing diversity of creeds.
As the title of Professor Adler's contribution to the YeaTboolc
suggests, he is not attempting an exposition of a philosophy of
education. He is rather offering a defense of the philosophy of
education. The question whether there can be a philosophy of
education, Professor Adler answers in the affirmative. The question
whether the1·e can be a variety of philosophies of education, he
answers in the negative. He believes there can be only one
philosophy of education, that is to say, every philosophy of education must rest on a set of absolute and universal principles, one
and the same set. ''There is only one true philosophy of education, only one body of philosophical knowledge about education,
and not a variety of equally entertainable 'systems,' each with its
own arbitrary 'postulates' and 'definitions' " (p. 199).
Professor Adler begins his discussion by demonstrating on
rational grounds that not only the science, but also the philosophy
of education rests on solid ground. It rests not on opinion, but
on knowledge. Since the philosophy of education rests on knowledge, not on opinion, there can only be one set of true principles
and conclusions. These principles, of course, are true only in the
light of experienced fact and in terms of the canons of rational
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procedure. Professor Adler makes it clear, however, that the
principles of religious education rest on other grounds, namely,
on religious faith.
The dil!iculty of presenting a philosophy of education lies,
so Professor Adler believes, in the consideration that the philosophy
of education like the philosophy of law or the philosophy of art
does not deal with a clearly defined set of problems, as does, for
example, the philosophy of ethics or the philosophy of aesthetics.
A further difficulty is that the philosophy of education deals with
a set of problems "which require us to cross the boundaries of
such objectively constituted subject matters as ethics, politics,
of metaphysics, and psychology" (p. 203). It therefore becomes
necessary for the philosopher of education to state at the outset
which problems in education he means to include in his treatment.
Again, this set of problems can, according to Professor Adler, be
solved only in the light of prior philosophical knowledge. Such
knowledge the educator must possess in addition to his technical
competence or practical experience in the work of education.
What is the nature of the problems which the philosopher
of education must solve? They are practical rather than theoretical,
that is to say, they are concerned with questions what should be
done, about what men should do in any realm of action or productions (p. 206). They differ from theoretical questions, for
these describe and explain facts. They differ also from the
problems with which the science of education has to do. The
science of education has to do with theoretical problems inasmuch
as it is descriptive, or e:i:planatorJI, and not normative (p. 207).
In agreement with Professor Adler's view of the nature of
problems with which the philosophy of education deals, is his
de6nition of education. ''Education is the process by which those
powers (abilities, capacities) of men that are susceptible to
habituation are perfected by good habits, through means aTtisticallv
contrived, and employed by one man to help another or himself
achieve the eml in view (i.e., good habits)" (p. 209). This definition of education implies, according to Professor Adler, that the
problems of education are concerned with the good, for education
aims to form not any sort of habits, but only good habits, traditionally analyzed as the virtues. They are furthermore aTtistic
problems, problems of how to use means for producing certain
desirable effects as ends. They are also ethical problems in so
far as they require us to consider the virtues and to understand
their role as means in achieving the ultimate end of life, happiness.
They are, finally, political problems in so far as they require us
to consider the responsibility, not simply of one man to another,
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but of the community to its members, with regard to helping
them become educated (pp. 209, 210).
It is clear therefore, from Professor Adler's point of view,
that the philosophy of education deals with problems that are
norme&tive. But if they are normative, then It is obvious that the
philosophy of education includes questions about the ultimate ends
of the process of education and about the means in general. In fa~
the study of ends and means are the basic considerations of the
philosophy of education.
But the philosophy of education also conceives education as
a co-operative enterprise. "The arts of learning and teaching
merely assist in the cultivation of a mind by co-operating with its
natural processes of knowing, just as agricultural techniques assist
nature in the production of vegetables" (p. 211). Professor Adler
believes that education is almost exclusively and most always
education-by-another, that is, a co-operative affair. This the
philosophy of education must recognize.
P1·ofessor Adler devotes some space to what he believes are
the major divisions of the educational process. These are:
1. Self-education and education-by-another;
2. Types of habit established by education - these are basically
intellectual and moral habits;
3. Individual differences in relation to education. We note
here his statement: "Brutes can be trained or conditioned, but
they cannot be educated, for education, whether by one's seU or
by :mother, is always a work of reason, and brutes are irrational"
(p. 215).
4. Institutional or non-institutional education.
The scope, then, of the philosophy of education is:
1. The ends of education must be conceived in such a way
that they hold equally for sell-education and education-byanother;
2. The philosophy of education is concemed neither principally
nor exclusively with the work of the elementary or even the
secondary schools; it is concemed with all levels and with all
forms of education;
3. The philosopher of education must consider the education
of youth as merely preparatory to adult education and all educationby-another, whether or not institutional, as preparatory to seUeducation. In other words the philosopher of education must
always take into conside1·ation that the educated adult is the end
of the educational process, and that all institutionalized education
is only a means to that end.
4. Educational institutions cannot be primarily responsible
for mo1·al education. Institutionally, the primary responsibility
for moral education lies in the home and the Church and in the
law-making and law-enforcing functions of the political communiw.
5. An educational philosophy can be adequate pracffcaUy only
if it is subalternated to moral theology [sic].
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Professor Adler is persuaded that there are absolute ends and
means in education which the philosopher of education must take
into account. ''The 11,ltimcite ends of education are the same for
all men at all times and everywhere. They are absolute and
universal principles" (p. 221). "Similarly, it must be said that
educational means in genffCll are the same for all men at all times
evervwhere. If the ultimate ends of education are its first principles, the means m geneT11l are its seconda1-y principles" (p. 222).
"The scope of the philosophy of education goes no further than
this - to know tJ&eae (lTat 11ml seccmdci,,, principle• in cm abaolute
and univerml
(p. 222).
mcinneT"
Professor Adler distinguishes between "policies" which govern
a class of cases and "practices" which govern a single case. Such
''policies" and ''practices" however, since they lie in the sphere
of opinion, do not concern the philosophy of •education. The
philosophy of education deals only with univl!T'a11l principles (principles which govern every case in point), for these lie in the
sphere of knowledge. Reduced to practice, this means: The
philosopher of education formulates the principles of education,
but he determines no policies and makes no decisions (p. 228).
"The philosopher of education is primarily concerned with the
educational ideal, with answering the question What is the best
education 11b1olutelt1, that is, for any man according to his essence?"
(p. 229).
To the question whether the problems of educational philosophy
are ethical or political, Professor Adler replies: "Since the ends
are the first principles and the means are secondary principles,
the problems of educational philosophy are primarily ethical (promotion of the good of the individual) and only secondarily political"
(promotion of the good of the State) (p. 231).
But now comes the important question: How does the educational philosopher solve the problems which lie in the sphere of
philosophic inquiry? The answer to this question constitutes the
second part of Professor Adler's essay.
To begin with, Professor Adler cautions the educator not to
confuse policies and principles. Much disagreement in educational practice arises from such confusions. The educational
philosopher can resolve conflicts in policy. He can do so in two
ways, either (1) by demonstrating that one line of policy necessarily follows from the true principles, whereas another is incompatible with the true principles rightly understood; or (2) where
two or several policies are seen to be compatible with the true
principles, he may be able to show that one is probably better
than the rest as a particularization of the principles for this type
of situation (p. 235). In the former solution he would answer the
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question "What Is the best education absolutely?" in the second
the question "What is the best education relative to this or that
type of situation?"
In the last section of the second part of the essay Professor'
Adler lays down basic considerations which the educational phllnaopher must take into account when he attempts to solve a problem
in the light of philosophic principles. He develops, for lack of
space, only the first. But we shall enumerate all of them. They ue:
1. A demonstration that the first principles of education (the
ends) are absolute and universal;
2. A demonstrative analysis of these ends in detail, their
number, their order, and relation to one another;
3. A demonstration that the secondary principles of education
(the means in general) are absolute and universal;
4. A demonstrative analysis of these means in detail, thclr
number, their order, and relation to one another;
5. A demonstrative analysis of the relation between the means
in general and their ends;
6. A demonstrative critique of educational policies so far as
these, in whole or in part, are incompatible with the true principles
rightly understood; and
7. A less than demonstrative analysis of the variety of educational policies which particularize the principles for different
possible types of contingent situations, attempting to say which
sort of policy is probably best relative to a given set of possible
contingencies (p. 235).
In developing the first of these considerations, Professor Adler
does not expound the actual demonstration; he merely shows
what is involved in such a demonstration. He does this largely
in terms of syllogistic argumentation.
Summarizing the basic thoughts of Professor Adler's essay,
we venture the following:
1. He believes with Aristotle that reason is the distinetlve
characteristic of man and is the same for all men;
2. He believes in absolute principles and thus QPposea Professor Dewey, the experimentalists, and the ''progressives";
3. He leaves it to the practitioner in education and the scientist
in education to solve problems which ue descriptive, for he
holds that educational philosophy is basically normative;
·
4. He believes that the field of philosophic inquiry in education
is restricted to principles and that it Is not concerned with policies
and practices;
5. "He recognizes that to the extent which metaphysics may
reveal the existence of God and man's dependence on Him, a purely
natural or intellectual education is disclosed as inadequate for
achieving perfection of man" (criticism by Professor Brubacher,
p. 299).

https://scholar.csl.edu/ctm/vol14/iss1/2

20

Bretscher: Toward a Lutheran Philosophy of Education
28

Toward a Lutheran Phlloaopby of &lucatlon

E. The Philoaophv of Catholic Educ:c1tion, by William McGucken, S. J.
Professor McGucken
professor
is
of education at St. Louis University, St. Louis, Mo. His chief books are: The Jeauita and
Educ:c&ticm (1932) and The CatholicEducation.
Wav in
(1934). He
baa also contributed articles to educational journals.
Professor Mc:Gucken's presentation lacks the charm of Professor Kilpatrick's style, the flash and flare of Professor Breed's
argumentation, the calm and reflective mood of Professor Horne,
the persuasiveness of Professor Adler's dialectics, but it makes
up for these deficiencies, if deficiencies they be, by the weight
of its Implications.
Following a brief introduction in which Professor McGucken
tells us that "to understand the philosophy of Catholic education,
it is necessary to understand • . . the Catholic philosophy of life"
{p. 251), that "the essentials of Christian philosophy are found
in the New Testament and the early writings of the Fathers of
the Church" (p. 251), and that "through all the centuries from
Augustine to Aquinas and Suarez and Bellarmine to Newman and
Chesterton and Pius XII there is seen a uniform pattern of the
Christian philosophy of life" (p. 251), he discusses the Catholic
philosophy of education under the following major heads: 1. Philosophic Bases of Catholic Position; 2. Theological Bases of the
Catholic Theory of Education; 3. Objectives of Catholic Education;
4. Nature of Knowledge; and 5. Nature of Society. In his conclusion he summarizes the essentials in the philosophy of Catholic
education.
In the chapter "Philosophic Bases of Catholic Position" Professor McGucken speaks in defense of the ability of human
reason to ascertain truths about God and man and in defense of
metaphysics. Reason tells man that there ls a God. This truth
that there is a God, Professor McGucken regards a cornerstone
of scholasticism. He says, "Scholastic philosophy is theocentric.
Catholic life and thought and education have God as their basis"
(p. 252). This God is "not the undying energy of the physicist, not
the vague Impersonal being of the Deist, but He ls a personal God,
who baa created man, upon whom man is dependent, and to whom,
therefore, man baa certain duties and obligations" (p. 252) . There
are, so he maintains, rational proofs for the existence of God, one
of which is the argument from contingency. "This fact of facts,
the existence of a personal God, is of supreme imporlance for
any program of education. • • . In the area of character education . • • the Catholic would hold that any character-tralnlng program that left God out of consideration would be not merely
Inadequate but utterly false" (p. 253).
Reason, so Professor McGucken continues, also tells us somePublished by Scholarly Resources from Concordia Seminary, 1943
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thing about man. Scholast1c phllosophy, arguing from reason,
holds:
I
1. That man was created by God, created for a purpose. That
purpose ls man's happiness, a happiness to be realized only perfectly in God;
2. That man is composed of body and soul, united in essential
unity. Therefore it ls not the mind that thinks (idealism), not
the body that feels (materialism), it ls the person, John Smith,
that thinks and feels;
3. That the soul is immaterial, spiritual, that is, intrinsically
independent of matter, although necessarily united to the body to
form a composite;
4. That man has an intellect; he is capable of understanding,
of forming judgment., of drawing conclusions;
5. That man has free will. . . . Free will does not imply that
we act without a motive. Nor does it imply that all human acts
nre free.
6. Because of his intellect and free will man is essentially
different from the highest form of brute life. Man is an animal, but
a rational animal.
7. Since the soul of man is immaterial or spiritual, it can be
destroyed by God alone;
8. Some human acts are of their very nature good and
deserving of praise; other human acts are of their very nature,
thnt is, intrinsically, bad and deserving of blame. The scholastic
holds that the1·e is a norm to determine the good act from the
bad act.
'l'his norm is man's rational nature taken in its entirety.
Reason teaches that man's nature is composite, made up of the
body and soul; that it is social by its very essence; that it is contingent, not 1·esponsible for its own being and existence, but
dependent on its Creator, God. Therefore man has duties to
himself, to his neighbor, to his God.
In view of the light that reason throws on man's existence,
it is possible to formulate a rational definition of education. Professor McGucken approves of the following:
Education is the organized development and equipment of
all the powers of a human being, moral, intellectual, and physical,
by and for their individual social uses, directed towards the union
of these activities with their Creator as their final end (p. 255).
Yet reason cannot tell us all about God 'and man. This
reftection leads Professor McGucken to devote a chapter to
"theological bases of the Catholic theory of education." In this
chapter he develops chiefty the Catholic doctrine of the supernature and its implications. Man has a supemature. God added
this to man's body and soul at creation. Adam lost this supernature when he fell into sin. His descendants also lost it. This
loss Professor McGucken defines as "deprivation." This su_per-
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nature was restored to man by the atoning work of Jesus ChrisL
Both Calvin and Rousseau are wrong: Calvin because he believed in the total depravity of man, Rousseau because he believed
in the total goodneu of man. Only the Catholic Church has the true
teaching regarding the fall of man with ita doctrine of "deprivation."
In the next chapter Professor llllcGucken enlarges on the
objectives of Catholic education. Though there are specific objectives for the various levels of Catholic education, everything
taught within all schools of Catholics must be taught in the frame
of reference to the supernatural. From the ET1Ct1clical on. CILristian. Education issued by Pius XI he quotes a number of passages,
only three of which I am reproducing here in whole or in part:
The proper and Immediate end of Christian education is to
co-operate with divine grace in forming the true and perfect Christian, that is, to form Christ Himself in those regenerated by
Baptism. . . .

I

Hence the true Christian, _product of Christian education, is
the supernatural man who thlnka, judges, and acts constantly and
consistently in accordance with right reason illumined by the
supernatural light of the example and teaching of Christ; in other
words, to use the current term, the true and finished man of
character .•.
The true Christian does not renounce the activities of this
life, he does not stunt his natural faculties; but he develops and
perfects them, by co-ordinating them with the supernatural. . . •
We pass over most of the content of the chapter in which
Professor McGucken discusses the "nature of knowledge" - it is
the Ariatotellan-Aqulnaa theory - and merely cnll attention to
some implications of his theory of a liberal education. Also a
llberal education must have a religious outlook. "If religion is
banned from a llberal education, you have merely an incomplete
education, you have a maimed and distorted education" (p. 280).
What are the elements of a liberal education? How are they to
be integrated? Professor McGucken replles:
Classical culture, Christian culture, the medieval synthesis of
Thomas Aquinas, and modem science and modem thought - these
are the strands that the Catholic believes must be combined somehow into unity to provide a liberal education for the youth of
our day•••• The answer to the problem of integration is one
word, a monosyllable, Christ. Christianity is Christ (pp. 280, 281).
In the final chapter, titled "Nature of Society," Professor
llllcGucken shows that on the purely natural level there are two
societies of educational import-the State and the family. Of these
two, the family has priority over the State (scholastlcism disagrees
with Aristotle on this point). But there is, ln the aupematural
order, a third society concemed with education, the Church.
"Since education, in the Catholic view, has a necessary connection
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with man's supernatural destiny, the Catholic Church rightly
clnlms that the education. of her children belongs to her preeminently" (p. 282).
In. his concluding paragraphs Professor McGucken calls attention to some essentials in the philosophy of Catholic education.
They are the Catholic doctrines regarding the nature and supernatural destiny of man; the nature of truth ("truth exists • • •
reason is capable of reaching with complete certainty the most
sublime truths of the natural order ... for the truths of the supernatural order revelation is needed,'' p. 285) ; and agencies of
education ("since man has a supernatural destiny, any educational
system that fails to impart raugious instruction is not acceptable
to the Catholics,'' p. 285) . Accidentals in the philosophy of Catholic education are, according to Professor McGucken, the curriculum
(" the one thing the Catholic will insist on is that, whatever type
the curr iculum may be, the first place must be assigned to religion,"
p. 286); method ("the Catholic cu a Catholic is not concerned with
method. . . . Method must have as its aim the teaching of the
child to' think for himself, to express adequately his own thoughts,
and to appreciate in a human way the true, the beautiful, and the
good" p. 286); freedom versus discipline ("The Catholic school ••.
believes in discipline, but that discipline must eventually be selfdiscipline. . . . Discipline is necessary. Discipline means right
order,'' p. 286).
In summarizing Professor McGucken's educational views, we
note in particular the following:
1. Catholic education makes reason an important source of
knowledge and an arbiter of truth;
2. Education must be God-centered. There can be no genuine
morality without a knowledge and fear of God;
3. Knowledge exists. It is based on reason and on revelation;
4. There are absolute truths;
5. Man is a rational being;
6. Man has a supernature; this is an addition to his nature of
body and soul and implies a supernatural life of grace with a
supematw·al destiny of union with God;
7. Original sin means the deprivation of this supernature.
8. Catholic education aims to restore this supernature.
9. The child is superior to the State.
10. The Church is responsible for the religious education of
its constituency.
11. ''The objective of the Church is to realize the consequences
of a child's incorporation with Christ through baptism, a ••• realization that Christ and the Church of which he is a member are one
thing-the Mystical Body of Christ" (p. 283).
We have now concluded our analyses of the five current
. philosophies of education represented in the Yearbook. There
https://scholar.csl.edu/ctm/vol14/iss1/2
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remains the tuk, however, of est.bibbing relationships between
them, that Is, of pointing out agreements and differences. In the

final essay of the Y Nt'booJc Professor Brubacher offers such a
critical and comparative analpl& Lack of space forbids us to
repeat what Professor Brubacher hu most successfully done.
We shall merely call attention to two cardinal differences between
these philosophies. The one relates to a definition of terms, the
other to the attitude of these philosophies of education to divine
revelation.
A!& Professor Adler has pointed out, a philosopher of education
ought clearly define the scope of his operations in the field of
education. Professor Adler defined this scope for himself. We have
noted that for him it is vastly different from the areas in which
the practitioner in education operates. It will be remembered, too,
that the other philosophies of education represented in the Yeat'&ook. particularly experimentalism, idealism, and scholasticism,
do not proceed as Professor Adler does. In these philosophies of
education considerable space is devoted to matters which lie
squarely within the field of educational practice. The question
therefore arises: What is the job that a philosophy of education
ls expected to do? In other words: Is Professor Adler's point of
view well taken, or ls it legitimate also to regard the analyses of
Professors Kilpatrick, Home, Breed, and McGucken as philosophies
of education? In our humble opinion, Professor Adler's point is not
only well taken, but also absolutely compelling unless the word
philo1ophv ls divested of the peculiar meaning which originally
attached to it and ls but another synonym for "synthesis," or
"overview," or "Weltanschauung," or scientific description of a
body of materials more or less related.
With respect to the attitude of the five philosophies of education presented in the Y ec&t'booJc to divine revelation, we note sharp
points of difference. Experimentalism, to begin with, takes a negative, if not hostile, attitude to revelation. Its pragmatic outlook
does not allow for transcendental truths. Realism shares with
experimentalism this attitude toward the Bible. Idealism manifests
a high regard for Scripture, though it ls not apparent from the
Yeat'&ooJc: whether or not Professor Home subscribes to the fundamental teaching of the Bible, salvation by grace alone through
faith in Christ. Professor Adler specifically states that he is presenting a natural or secular philosophy of education. "However,"
as Professor Brubacher correctly observes, "he recognizes that
to the extent to which metaphysics may reveal the existence of God
and man's dependence on Him, a purely natural or intellectual
education ls disclosed as inadequate for achieving the perfection
of man. For this purpose he admits another kind of Jmowledge
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Is "pouible,' that of faith and revelation" (p. 299). But even If
Professor Adler bad made faith In dlvlne revelation ■ cornerstone
in his philosophy of education, the queatlon would still be whether
he accepts the basic teaching of the Bible that man Is saved by
grace alone through faith In Christ. Catholicism regards the Bible
as a aource of knowledge and of greater authority than the postulates of reason and stresses the Intimate relationship that exists
between the believer and Christ. Professor McGucken, as was
pointed out before, even asserts that "the Catholic believes humbly
and sincerely that the answer to the problem of Integration Is
one word, a monosyllable, Christ. Chrlstlanlty u Christ" (pp. 280
and 281). Yet nowhere does Professor McGucken clearly Indicate
that Jesus is the Way, the Truth, and the Life (John 14:8) In the
sense that only faith ln Him, without the deeds of the Law, insures
eternal bliss.
We ought now, after this brief comparison of the philosophies
of education presented in the Yearbook, proceed to suggest basic
considerations of a Lutheran philosophy of education. But before
doing so, we believe it important to relate the philosophies presented
in the Yearbook to the historical and educational background
which they reflect. Both this background and the fundamental
viewpoints of a Lutheran philosophy of education will be dlscussed
in a second article, to be published in the next Issue of this journal.
St. Louis, Mo.
PAUL BRZTSCBZR

Homemade Homiletics
Paper Read at a Pastors' Institute

Homiletics is that branch of theology which treats of homilies,
or the making of sermons. And when I have chosen as my theme
"Homemade Homiletics," lt means just that. They are sermons
which have been prayed over, thought out, worked out, polished off,
and put into final form for their delivery by the pastor himself. For
while we often hear from our pulpits good, soundly doctrinal sermons, which are both instructive and edifying, yea, at times most
inspiring, the making of the sermon has all too often been but a
gleaning from what other men have thought through and developed.
And so, while those who hear the sermon may go home strengthened and encouraged for the tasks ahead of them in the coming
week, the pastor will Ump home looking for crutches on which to
steady himself when he again ascends the pulpit. The sermon will
not have proved as helpful to the preacher himself as it would have
proved had he faithfully labored over theme and divlslons as their
originator and perfecter himself.
3
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